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Abstract
The consequences of the recent corporate scandals have directed the attention of corporations 
towards the opportunistic behaviors of managers; thus, evaluation of agency costs encountered within 
the firm. The divergence of interest between the managers and shareholders has a potential to con-
stitute a threat to the firms’ financial performance. Due to the rising importance of the topic for both 
academic literature and practical grounds, this study attempts to evaluate the link between agency 
costs of equity and financial performance of selected public firms operating in BRIC countries be-
tween the years 2003 and 2014, inclusive. Three measures have been utilized to proxy for agency costs 
of equity; namely, asset utilization ratio, operating expense ratio, and the ratio of free cash flows to 
total assets. An additional interaction variable is also generated to take into account the existence of 
investment opportunities when free cash flows are abundant. The findings based on panel data analysis 
are considered to provide useful insight upon an additional explanation to the presence of financial 
performance differences among the firms other than simply firm-specific attributes and emphasize 
the importance of finding mechanisms for alleviating agency costs to attain the overall goal of share-
holder wealth maximization.
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VEKÂLET MALİYETLERİNİN FİNANSAL PERFORMANS 
FARKLILIKLARINI AÇIKLAMADAKİ ROLÜ: 
BRIC ÜLKELERİNDE FAALİYET GÖSTEREN SEÇİLMİŞ 
HALKA AÇIK FİRMALAR ÜZERİNE AMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA
Özet
Son zamanlarda yaşanan şirket skandallarının sonuçları firmaların dikkatini yöneticilerin fırsatçı 
davranışlarına ve dolayısıyla firmalarda karşılaşılan vekalet maliyetlerinin değerlendirilmesine yönelt-
miştir. Yöneticiler ve hissedarlar arasındaki çıkar çatışmaları firmaların finansal performanslarına yönelik 
bir tehdit unsuru oluşturmaktadır. İlgili konunun akademik literatür ve uygulama alanındaki artan önemi 
sebebiyle, bu çalışma öz sermayeye ilişkin vekalet maliyetleri ve finansal performans arasındaki ilişkiyi 
BRIC ülkelerinde faaliyet gösteren seçilmiş halka açık firmalar üzerinde 2003 ve 2014 yılları arasında 
değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Öz sermayeye ilişkin vekalet maliyetlerini ölçmek için üç farklı değişken 
kullanılmıştır. Bunlar; varlık kullanım oranı, faaliyet giderleri oranı ve serbet nakim akımların toplam 
varlıklara oranı olarak belirlenmiştir. Ayrıca, nakit akımlarının bol olduğu durumda yatırım fırsatlarının 
varlığını göz önünde bulundurmak için de ek bir etkileşim değişkeni oluşturulmuştur. Panel veri analize 
dayandırılmış bulgular firmalar arasındaki finansal performans farklılıklarına ek bir açıklama getirmiş ve 
bunların sadece firmaya özgü niteliklerden kaynaklanmadığını vurgulamıştır. Ayrıca, bu çalışma hissedar-
ların varlıklarını maksimize etme amacına ulaşmak için firmaların vekalet maliyetlerini düşürmek adına 
çeşitli makenizmalar geliştirmenin önemini vurgulamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Vekalet Maliyetleri, Finansal Performans, BRIC Ülkeleri, Panel Veri Analizi.
I. INTRODUCTION 
Separation of ownership and control; thus, division of firms’ shares between managers and 
owners, is a factor affecting firm value as stressed by the milestone study of Berle and Means 
[1]. Their study emphasizes that little equity ownership by managers and a widely dispersed 
ownership by shareholders will lead to the deployment of firms’ assets for the benefit of man-
agers. Accordingly, the divergence of interest between managers, who are corporate insiders, 
and minority shareholders, who are outside investors, has been a significant area of research 
in academic work gaining momentum with the prominent studies of Ross [2] and Jensen and 
Meckling [3]; whereby, the later two define agency relationship as a contract under which the 
principles engage another person to act on their behalf by delegating the authority of decision 
making to that agent. The agents’ actions will not be in the best interests of the principle when 
the parties in the associated relationship are utility maximizers. Based on the convergence of 
interest hypothesis, alignment of shareholders’ and managers’ interest with a rise in manage-
rial ownership is assumed to improve firm value since the conflict of interest arising between 
managers and shareholders is reduced as insider equity ownership is increased. Contrarily, 
entrenchment hypothesis predicts corporate assets to be less valuable when market discipline 
is less sufficient in controlling the managers with an increase in ownership; thus, leading to a 
reduction in the incentive to maximize value [4].
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Henry [5] states that agency costs can occur in various forms some of which can be named 
as managerial self-serving behaviors, excessive perquisite consumption, non-optimal invest-
ment decisions, and corporate fraud. According to Jensen and Meckling [3], two broad catego-
ries of agency costs exist in that they can be equity or debt related. To name a few, risk-shifting 
and underinvestment problems can be shown as examples of debt-related agency costs. How-
ever, this study focuses on equity related agency costs that arise when managers pursue their 
own interests regardless of shareholders’ well-being, which indicates misalignment of managers’ 
and shareholders’ incentives. The proxies that will be provided in detail in the section related 
to variable selection are employed to capture agency costs of equity such as managerial extrav-
agance that is defined by Chen and Yur Austin [6] to be an indicator of excessive managerial 
discretionary spending with potential to distort corporate earnings. Another aspect that is 
aimed to be measured is poor asset management that may lead to overinvestment with idle 
cash remaining after all available positive net present value projects have been undertaken and 
managers utilizing the remaining funds for their own good [7]. According to Florackis [8], 
agency costs occurring between the claimholders of the firm exist in imperfect capital markets 
and firm value is diminished on the condition that the market expects that these costs are to 
be realized. Therefore, poor corporate policy choices arising as a result of incentive conflicts 
within the firm can distort corporate performance.
This study attempts to evaluate this significant issue to provide further insight as to whether 
agency costs of equity can be regarded to be one of the determinants of financial performance 
in BRIC countries. BRIC is the acronym for an association of four major emerging national 
economies: Brazil, Russia, India, and China which are the fastest growing and largest emerg-
ing market economies in the world. They account for almost three billion people, which also 
accounts for almost half of the total population of the world, with Brazil having a population 
of 201,046,886, Russia 143,451,702, India 1,210,193,422 and China 1,354,040,000 people. The 
BRIC’s contribution to the total GDP is about $ 15,412.8 bn. (Brazil $ 2,242.8 bn., Russia $ 
2,118.0 bn., India $ 1,870.6 bn. and China $ 9,181.4 bn.), which shows that BRIC’s economies 
have contributed to the majority of world GDP growth [9]. As noted above, interest in the 
BRIC countries is not only focused on the size of their economies, but also on their growth 
potential. In economic terms, China and India are manufacturing-based economies and big 
importers of natural resources with their development strategies being export led and based 
on domestic industrialization for export markets. The other two; namely Brazil and Russia, are 
huge exporters of natural resources with resource-based economies and commodity exporting 
[9]. Accordingly, BRIC countries are selected as the dataset of the study due to the significant 
and rising importance of these economies. Soundness and financial performance of the compa-
nies operating in these countries are utterly important as they add to the respective countries’ 
GDP growth and well-functioning nature of their economies. Since potential agency costs are 
detrimental to the firms’ financial indicators, their influence on the selected proxy of financial 
performance is evaluated in the empirical part of the study to see how managers’ self-oriented 
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behaviors are affecting the firm. Depending on the results, further courses of actions should 
be undertaken to deal with the problems arising as a result of the separation of ownership and 
management. 
As will be provided in detail in the section related to hypothesis generation, the main pur-
pose of the study is to evaluate the link between agency costs of equity and financial perfor-
mance of selected public firms operating in BRIC countries between the years 2003 and 2014. 
This study builds on the prominent studies that aim to quantify equity related agency costs 
such as those of Ang et al. [10] and Sign and Davidson [11] and other studies that attempt to 
analyze the impact of agency costs on various indicators of firm performance [4], [12], and 
[13]. Accordingly, the remainder of the study is organized as follows: The following section 
provides literature review related to the topic. Then, the hypothesis is generated depending on 
associated theories of agency and free cash flows. The fourth section is dedicated to research 
design followed by the results of the analyses. Concluding remarks, implications of the study 
and areas for further research are revealed in the last section. 
II. LITERATURE
The link between productive efficiency, which can be considered to stand as a form of 
performance, and agency costs have been studied in the academic arena as early as the 1970s 
with the prominent study of Stigler [14] acting as one of the first works drawing attention to 
the associated notion. One strand of literature that investigates the influence of agency costs 
on firm performance has used regressions of various performance measures on indicators of 
leverage. Berger and Patti [15] constitute an outstanding example; whereby, they test whether 
increasing leverage leads to a reduction in agency costs of outside equity which further leads to 
an enhancement in firm performance. However, this study implements a more direct approach 
by studying the influence of selected proxies of agency costs, which will further be described 
in detail, on the selected financial performance measure.
The prominent study of Ang et al. [10] is one of the first studies attempting to quantify 
agency costs by the utilization of ratios extracted from the firms’ financial statements. Following 
and building upon their study, numerous other works, which will be provided in the variable 
selection section, have been conducted to measure agency costs by the utilization of accounting 
proxies. An array of literature has focused on evaluating the relationship between these costs 
and firm performance by including various different proxies in their models. Cole and Mehran 
[12] study the influence of ownership structure and associated agency costs on firm perfor-
mance by the use of stock returns as the performance measure. The prominent study of Vogt 
and Vu [16] documents results consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis; whereby, those 
firms that plow back a considerable amount of free cash flow into the firm for capital spending 
demonstrate low levels of excess returns. Contrarily, those firms with high dividend yields and 
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stock repurchases are found to demonstrate positive excess returns. Another study that utilizes 
stock returns as a performance measure is that of Chang et al. [17]. This study is mainly built 
around asset substitution and underinvestment problems evaluating the stock valuation effects 
of secured debt offerings. 
Other than focusing on stock returns in the selected dataset of emerging markets, this 
study uses an accounting based measure of firms’ financial performance; namely, earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). Wang [13] also includes return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as dependent variables in two separate models 
that mainly attempt to evaluate the relationship between agency costs and performance on a 
dataset of publicly listed firms on Taiwan Stock Exchange during the 2002-2007 periods. Other 
models constructed in the same study utilize Tobin’s Q for firm value and stock returns for 
stock market performance as dependent variables. A recent study conducted on Tehran Stock 
Exchange during the six year period between 2006 and 2012 on a dataset of 63 firms use four 
different measures as the dependent variables of the models again probing the link between 
free cash flows, performance and firm value. Where ROA and ROE are used as indicators of 
firms’ financial performance, stock return is used to account for stock market performance. 
Additionally, Tobin’s Q is utilized to capture firm value in a separate model [18]. Another study 
conducted by Pouraghajan et al. [19] adopts a similar perspective for a dataset of 140 companies 
listed on Tehran Stock Exchange covering the time span between the years 2006 and 2011. The 
two models encompass the same efficiency ratios; namely, total asset turnover ratio, operating 
costs ratio, the ratio of administrative and selling costs to net sales, the ratio of advertising cost 
and research and development cost to net sales, standard deviation of operating income to 
net sales, standard deviation of net income to net sales, and the ratio of free cash flows to net 
sales, which act as the independent variables. The dependent variables of the models are ROA 
and ROE, which are used to capture firms’ financial performance. A prior work performed 
by Mojtahedzadeh and Nahavandi [20] also conducts an empirical analysis on Tehran Stock 
Exchange with a perspective to investigate the ability of free cash flows measure in predicting 
firms’ long-term profitability. Additional hypothesis have been structured to test the relation-
ship between agency costs of free cash flow and income management together with the link 
between major stockholders and income management. The study that is conducted on a dataset 
set of 106 public companies listed during the 2003-2007 period utilizes Tobin’s Q as the measure 
of long-term profitability. The findings as to the hypothesis related to our study demonstrate 
the presence of a negative and significant relationship between the selected proxies of agency 
costs and firm performance.
A study that investigates whether agency problems can explain performance differences 
of 590 non-financial public firms listed on Korean Stock Exchange during the Asian finan-
cial crisis utilizes both stock returns and ROA as performance measures. The selected agency 
cost proxies are three ownership structure variables, one free cash flow variable, two leverage 
variables, and one variable related to the degree of diversification. The findings demonstrate 
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that the measures of agency problems are less closely linked to operating performance with 
investors paying more attention to agency problems during periods of financial crises as seen 
by a more strongly pronounced influence on stock market performance. Furthermore, they also 
document that corporate governance structure of a company is an important determinant of 
the significant role of agency problems during the crisis period [21]. 
As far as our literature review is concerned, there are a limited number of studies focusing 
on the direct link between agency costs of equity and firm performance. Additionally, there is 
a lack of evidence on the quantification of agency costs and further determining their impact 
on the financial performance of the firms in the selected group of emerging countries; namely, 
BRIC. Based on prior empirical analysis conducted, literature review and major theories of 
agency and free cash flow, this study aims to fill in a gap by focusing on the emerging markets 
of BRIC countries and attempts to provide further insight onto the link between agency costs 
and financial performance of the firm. 
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Depending on previous literature, this subsection is dedicated to the formation of hypoth-
esis that aims to investigate the relationship between the selected proxies for equity related 
agency costs and financial performance of the firm. By using direct and indirect proxies for 
agency costs encountered within the firm, this study attempts to investigate the influence of 
managers’ self-motivated behaviors on the selected proxy of financial performance with the 
variables being explained in detail below.  
The building blocks of the study’s hypothesis mainly rest upon agency theory and associated 
free cash flow theory. The work of Jensen and Meckling [3] put forth the costs of an agent’s 
actions that arise due to the misalignment of the agent’s and shareholder’s interests. The mag-
nitude of these costs depends upon the degree to which the owners and delegated third parties 
such as monitoring institutions control the actions of outside managers [10]. 
Previous literature has utilized operating expense ratio as a direct measure of agency costs 
since the effectiveness of firm’s management in keeping operating expenses under control can 
be captured by this accounting measure [10]. Potential agency costs such as excessive perqui-
site consumption are assumed to deteriorate financial performance of the firm. A high level 
of discretionary spending is supposed to be harmful to the wealth of shareholders since these 
expenses are not related to income-generating activities [22]. 
As stated by Jensen [23] free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that needed for funding all 
projects with positive net present value. That excess cash flow may lead to poor investment 
decisions when it is left to the discretion of management. Shareholders can be confronted with 
potential agency conflicts when managers overinvest in the firm with the excess cash flow, 
which does not confirm with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization. Furthermore, diver-
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gence of interest between shareholders and managers with respect to payout policies become 
more severe when the organization has substantial free cash flow. It has to be emphasized that 
investment opportunities play a significant role for agency costs of free cash flow such that 
firms with low growth opportunities are more likely to suffer agency costs due to investment 
in unprofitable projects.
Managers’ self-motivated behaviors will also lead to low levels of asset utilization providing 
further evidence of the presence of agency costs within the firm [3]. Inefficient asset utiliza-
tion arises due to managers’ poor investment decisions and shirking. Sub-optimal investment 
decisions of management, inadequate commitment, and monitoring will also lead to the rise 
of agency costs resulting in a loss in firm value.
Accordingly, agency costs have a potential to influence firm performance; thus, can be 
regarded to be a determinant of firms’ financial performance other than the generally referred 
to firm-specific attributes in literature. Therefore, the divergence of interest between managers 
and shareholders and associated agency costs are assumed to be detrimental to the firm leading 
to lower financial performance with the hypothesis being constructed in its alternative form 
as follows;
H = The higher the level of agency costs encountered by the firm, the lower the financial 
performance as measured by EBITDA/TA.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
IV.1. Data and Sample Selection
This study utilizes a dataset belonging to BRIC countries with an observation period of 
twelve years between 2003 and 2014, inclusive. The major reason for the exclusion of prior 
year data rests upon the aim to achieve the largest firm-year observation for a balanced da-
taset; thereby, an optimal year is selected to act for the beginning of the period. Accordingly, 
companies that lack consecutive data and financial sector companies are also eliminated from 
the initial dataset. The final sample is made up of 132 firms with 39, 30, 26, and 37 firms 
belonging to Brazil, Russia, India, and China; respectively. Bloomberg database is utilized to 
extract the data with a total of 1584 firm-year observations that are analyzed in the Stata 11 
software package. 
IV.2. The Variables
This subsection is dedicated to the explanation of the variables included in the models of 
the study. Table IV.1 below provides the list of the dependent, explanatory, and control variables 
together with their abbreviations and definitions. Accordingly, detailed explanations as to the 
reasoning for the selection of the variables are provided accompanied by the previous other 
studies that have also employed the selected variables.
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Table 1. Summary of the Variables, Abbreviations, and Definitions
* This variable is an interaction variable; whereby, a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if the firm’s Tobin’s Q is less country median is multiplied by the free cash flows of the 
firm i in year t
IV.2.1. The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of this study is selected to be EBITDA to total assets labeled as 
EBITDA/TA. EBITDA is defined by Bloomberg to be an indicator of financial performance, 
which is net income with interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization added back to it. Ac-
cordingly, it is used as a proxy of financial performance in prior studies such as those of [24]; 
[25]. As EBITDA eliminates the effects of financing and accounting decisions, it can be used 
to evaluate companies’ financial performance. Furthermore, differences in tax rates, capital ex-
penditure and capital structure decisions are not taken into account by the use of this measure. 
This indicator has also been utilized in previous studies as a measure of operating performance 
[26], financial distress [27]; [28], and firm value [29].
 
IV.2.2. The Explanatory Variables
Three ratios have been used in this study to proxy for agency costs in the line with previ-
ous studies. These ratios are operating expense ratio; free cash flows divided by total assets, 
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and asset utilization ratio.  The first one, which is the operating expense ratio, is defined as 
operating expenses scaled by total assets and denoted by OPEXR. According to Ang et al. [10], 
the effectiveness of management in controlling agency costs including excessive perquisite 
consumption and other direct agency costs is captured in this measure. A relatively high oper-
ating expense ratio is assumed to be an indicator for the possibility that managers of the firm 
are expropriating wealth from shareholders as these expenses do not contribute to income 
generating activities and are incurred to satisfy the managers’ excessive personal consumption 
[30]. This proxy has been utilized by numerous studies in literature; namely, [10], [7]; [22]; [31]; 
[32]; [33], and [34]. 
The second proxy for agency costs is related to the magnitude of free cash flows generated 
by the firm calculated by the ratio of free cash flows to total assets, FCF/TA. The free cash 
flow figures that are extracted from the Bloomberg database are calculated as operating cash 
flow minus capital expenditures. As emphasized by Henry [5], the presence of free cash flows 
within the firm has a potential to result in agency problems. Jensen [23] states that generation 
of substantial free cash flows leads to a more severe conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers with respect to payout policies. The recent study of Park and Jang [35] shows 
that free cash flows deteriorate firm performance with an emphasis on the problems associated 
with overinvestment problem. Furthermore, an interaction variable is generated to account 
for the firms’ growth opportunities following [36], [37], and [38]. It has to be noted that high 
growth is defined as the case where the firm’s country adjusted Tobin’s Q is greater than the 
country median. Therefore, a dummy variable is generated and takes the value of 1 if the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q is less country median, indicating a firm with low growth opportunities. This dummy 
variable is then multiplied by the firm’s free cash flow figure to determine low growth-high 
free cash flow firms. The dependency of agency costs associated with free cash flows on the 
firms’ investment opportunities are stressed in the study of Chang et al. [17] in that firms with 
fewer growth opportunities in comparison to others are more likely to have free cash flows. 
Therefore, firms that qualify for being low-growth and high-cash-flow have a potential to have 
more agency costs; which is captured in this study by the generation of an interaction variable 
labeled as LGRWFCF.
The third measure of agency costs is asset utilization ratio, which is computed by the ratio 
of annual sales to total assets and denoted by ASSTUT. Sub-optimal investment decisions of 
management, lack of commitment, effort, and monitoring are regarded to be the major reasons 
as to why agency costs arise within the firm. The effectiveness of management in utilizing the 
firm’s assets and the degree of shirking is captured by this ratio. Accordingly, the loss of revenue 
associated with the inefficient use of assets is proxied by this ratio as well [39]. It is important 
to emphasize that asset utilization ratio is contrary to the previously identified two proxies in 
terms of the direction of its relationship with agency costs. Whereas OPEXR and FCF/TA are 
directly related to the degree of agency costs existing in the firm, ASSTUT in inversely related in 
that firms that exhibit low levels of asset utilization experience high levels of agency costs based 
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on the reasoning that management diverts investments to nonproductive assets [10]; [7]. Even 
though this ratio is also utilized in the study of McKnight and Weir [38], they emphasize some 
potential drawbacks of this measure. The first problem is related to sales’ not being synonymous 
with shareholder wealth as sales may not be depending on profitable activities. Additionally, 
some of the cash flows being generated by sales may be expropriated by management and not 
be distributed to shareholders. Nevertheless, numerous  prior studies in literature using this 
measure can be named as those of [10];  [11], [40]; [41]; [7]; [39]; [5]; [42]; [22]; [6]; [43]; [44]; 
[38]; [33]; [45]; [46]; [34]. 
IV.2.3. The Control Variables 
The models employ various control variables to more accurately evaluate the influence of 
agency costs on the firms’ financial performance. The selected variables that have a potential to 
influence the main variable of interest, EBITDA/TA, have been identified through an evaluation 
of previous empirical studies and can be named as weighted average cost of capital, firm size, 
leverage, prior year financial performance, and the country of origin.
The empirical modes control for the firms’ weighted average cost of capital denoted by 
WACC as the number of the profitable projects the firm can invest in has a potential to increase 
when the WACC of the firm is lower, which will be compatible with the shareholder wealth 
maximization goal of the firm. As suggested by Jung [47], WACC can be used to evaluate the 
specific performance of top management with respect to their decisions about financing and re-
source allocation. The framework developed in that study aims to utilize financial information 
to evaluate the ability of operators in managing business performance and is related to agency 
problems between top management and operators. Thus, the model in our study accounts for 
WACC due to the link this proxy has with agency costs and financial performance.
Natural log of total assets denoted by LNASST is included in the models to control for firm 
size. Majumdar [48] emphasizes the advantages possessed by large firms over smaller ones as 
the broad set of capabilities they possess, the economies of scale and scope they achieve, and 
the efficient manner in which they conduct their activities. Contrarily, smaller firms can be 
more flexible; thus, perform better as they are not structured to have many hierarchical levels 
and are less exposed to the phenomenon of loss of control [49]. Boardman et al. [50] explore 
performance differences among firms with an emphasis on agency costs and incorporate firm 
size as a control variable in their analysis. Another study conducted by Chrisman et al. [51] also 
utilizes firm size as a control variable with a focus on the relationship between performance 
and agency cost control mechanisms in family firms. Similarly, the recent study of Songini and 
Gnan [52], which investigate the same phenomenon with respect to family involvement, firm 
performance, and adoption of agency cost control mechanisms, also stresses the significance 
of firm size in value creation and; therefore, integrates this control variable into the analysis.
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It is important to include debt ratio as a control variable in analyzing the relationship 
between agency costs and financial performance since higher leverage is associated with a re-
duction in agency costs of equity by constraining the discretionary behaviors of managers and; 
thus, leads to an enhancement in firm performance [15]. As emphasized by Grossman and Hart 
[53], the threat of bankruptcy, which may result in loss of benefits on behalf of the managers, 
is one of the incentives that can lead to improved managerial performance. However, it has to 
be noted that agency costs of debt will rise as outside financing increases [3]. Higher expected 
costs of financial distress and liquidation will result in higher interest expenses to compensate 
debt holders for any expected losses. Consequently, the reduction in agency costs of equity can 
be overwhelmed by the increase in agency costs of debt resulting in higher total agency costs. 
Studies that have investigated the determinants of firm performance have focused on the sig-
nificance of capital structure decisions. To state a few of the recent studies, Vithessonthi and 
Tongurai [54] document the non-monotonic impact of leverage on operating performance, 
which is conditional on firm size with positive and negative impacts seen on small and large 
firms, respectively. Vaidean [55] finds performance to be higher when firms avoid debt and 
conduct their operations with a basis on equity. Another study with contradictory findings is 
that of Park and Jang [35] that focuses on the inter-relationships among capital structure, free 
cash flow, diversification, and firm performance. The findings show that free cash flows are 
reduced due to leverage resulting in an enhancement in firm performance. This study utilizes 
the ratio of total debt to total assets that is labeled by LEVR to control for the impact of leverage 
on financial performance.
The model also controls for the impact of prior year financial performance on current per-
formance due to the potential that good performers can tend to demonstrate superior perfor-
mance in the future than their non-performing counterparts.  This notion is also hypothesized 
by Kordestani et al. [56], whereby they evaluate the influence of prior year financial perfor-
mance on current performance as part of their analysis in the area of supply chain processes 
in the Swedish steel industry. The proxy that accounts for prior year performance differences 
is denoted by LEBITDA/TA in this study. 
Finally, it has to be noted that all of the four models are estimated using country dummies 
to account for the country specific influences that might occur on the link between financial 
performance and agency costs.
IV.3. The Methodology
The empirical part of this study employs panel data analysis that pools cross-sectional 
observations over several time periods. Two significant reasons have been emphasized by Arel-
lano [57] for the frequent use of this methodology in micro econometric empirical analyses. 
These can be stated as the need to control for ‘…unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in 
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cross-sectional models and the use of panel data ‘as a way of disentangling components of 
variance and estimating transition probabilities among states, and more generally to study the 
dynamics of cross-sectional populations’.
The hypothesis focusing on the link between the firms’ financial performance and agency 
costs are tested using the below four models. Whereas the dependent variable and associated 
control variables are the same for each model, the explanatory variable that stands for the 
agency costs encountered within the firm differs. It has to be noted that the explanatory vari-
able of the last model is an interaction variable measuring the degree of free cash flows in the 
case that the firm’s growth prospects are poor. The major reason for the inclusion of such an 
interaction variable relates to the expectation that the presence of free cash flows acting as a 
proxy for agency costs can prove to be detrimental for firms’ financial performance specifically 
in the case when there are poor growth opportunities for the firm. The Table IV.2 below depicts 
a summary of the models applied and variables employed to facilitate a better understanding 
of the empirical part of the study.  
Table 2. Empirical Models Utilized
Model Dependent Variable Explanatory Variable Control Variables
1 EBITDA/TA OPEXR WACC, LNASST, LEVR, LEBITDA/TA
2 EBITDA/TA FCF/TA WACC, LNASST, LEVR, LEBITDA/TA
3 EBITDA/TA ASSETUT WACC, LNASST, LEVR, LEBITDA/TA
4 EBITDA/TA LGRWFCF WACC, LNASST, LEVR, LEBITDA/TA
Breusch and Pagan [58] emphasize that invalid inferences may result due to biases in es-
timated standard errors when the assumptions of homoskedastic disturbances and fixed co-
efficients are not fulfilled. In this case, the utilization of OLS may result in substantial loss in 
efficiency. Therefore, Lagrangian multiplier test developed by Breusch and Pagan is applied 
to each model of the study to test for the presence of heteroskedastic disturbances. When the 
test results in small enough p-value, corrective action is taken, which is the use of GLS method 
in our case. The method of GLS is known as ‘OLS on the transformed variables that satisfy the 
standard least-squares assumptions’ [59]. The models are also tested for serial correlation since 
ignoring serial correlation when it exists will result in consistent but inefficient estimates of the 
regression coefficients and biased standard errors [60]. The existence of serial correlation in 
each model is tested for by the use of Wooldridge test. The findings of the associated two tests 
reveal the presence of hetereoskedasticity and autocorrelation in the dataset, which are dealt 
with by the use of GLS methodology. Furthermore, outliers that exist due to the large ranges in 
the distribution of data with respect to the variables labeled as OPEXR, ASSETUT, WACC, and 
LEVR have been eliminated from the initial sample in order to provide more representative re-
199
Öneri • Cilt 12, Sayı 45, Ocak 2016, ss. 187-210
sults. Accordingly, the models developed to test the hypothesis associated with the relationship 
between financial performance and selected proxies of agency costs are constructed as below; 
(1) EBITDA/TAit= β0+ β1  OPEXRit+ β2  WACCit  + β3 LNASSTit+ β4 LEVRit+ β5 LEBITDA/TAit+ ϵit
(2) EBITDA/TAit= β0+ β1  FCF/TAit+ β2  WACCit  + β3 LNASSTit+ β4 LEVRit+ β5 LEBITDA/TAit+ ϵit
(3) EBITDA/TAit= β0+ β1  ASSETUTit+ β2  WACCit  + β3 LNASSTit+ β4 LEVRit+ β5 LEBITDA/TAit+ ϵit
(4) EBITDA/TAit= β0+ β1  LGRWFCFit+ β2  WACCit  + β3 LNASSTit+ β4 LEVRit+ β5 LEBITDA/TAit+ ϵit
V.  DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
V.1. Descriptive Statistics
This subsection reports the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables included in the 
models for all four countries during the twelve year period between 2003 and 2014, inclusive. 
It has to be noted that potentially large variations in financial performance may arise due to 
different dynamics that emerge in each country. Accordingly, these differences are accounted 
for by the inclusion of country dummies and through the analysis of outliers to eliminate the 
occurrence of any misleading results.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables for the Complete Sample
The mean and median of the dependent variable, which stands for financial performance 
and is labeled by EBITDA/TA is found to be 0.1909 and 0.1493, respectively. Whereas the min-
imum value is documented to -0.1718, the maximum value for the overall sample is reported 
to be 2.8694.
As provided in detail in the subsection devoted to variable explanations, three continuous 
variables are used to proxy for agency costs. The first proxy, which is the operating expense 
ratio, has a mean and median of 0.3789 and 0.2043, respectively. Since a high standard deviation 
of 0.3362 indicates the presence of significant variance among the sample firms, outliers with 
respect to this variable are removed from the sample during the estimation process. Sample 
firms are identified to generate average annual free cash flows of 3.12% of total assets over 
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the twelve year period with the median firm demonstrating 2.59% in terms of the same proxy 
of agency costs. Furthermore, 75% of the firms in the sample have free cash flow to total as-
sets ratio of less than 0.0840. Additionally, the minimum value with respect to this variable is 
demonstrated to be -1.8858. Outliers have also been removed in the model that utilizes this 
proxy as the explanatory variable. Lastly, the average asset utilization ratio is documented to 
be 0.7695 with the median firm operating at efficiency level of 0.6747. As the statistics related 
to 3rd quartile indicate, the asset utilization ratio of 75% of the firms is less than 0.9619. It can 
be inferred from the high standard deviation of 0.4652 that there is also significant variation 
among the sample firms in terms of this proxy. Accordingly, the outliers as to this variable have 
been removed from the sample during the model estimation process. 
 When the descriptive statistics as to control variables are evaluated, it can be seen that the 
mean of sample firms in terms of WACC is 0.0928 with 75% of the firms having a WACC of less 
than 0.1170. The interquartile range is found to be 0.0490 (=0.1170-0.0680), indicating a low 
dispersion of estimates for the associated variable. The logarithm of total assets controlling for 
firm size is found to range between 4.4873 and 16.5353. Furthermore, sample firms are found 
to exhibit an average debt ratio of 0.2798 with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 1.8890, 
respectively. Accordingly, outliers with respect to debt ratio have been detected and removed 
before the model estimation process. The results related to prior year performance denoted by 
LEBITDA/TA are similar to current performance with mean and median values being 0.1954 
and 0.1516, respectively.
V.2. Correlation Coefficients
The Pearson correlation coefficients between pairs of control variables are demonstrated in 
Table V.2 below. Multicollinearity is regarded to be a serious issue if the pair-wise or zero-order 
correlation coefficient between two variables is higher than a reference point of 0.8 [61]. An 
evaluation of the coefficients and associated significance levels of the variables used in each 
model reveals that the models utilized are not contaminated by the problem of multicollinearity. 
Table 4. Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Control Variables
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V.3. Panel Data Analysis
Table V.3 provides the results of the panel data analysis based on the estimation of above 
stated four equations to mainly investigate the influence of agency costs on the financial perfor-
mance of the firm. As emphasized beforehand, the models differ on the basis of the explanatory 
variables utilized while the selected control variables are the same under each alternative model. 
Since the results of all models are the same with respect to the significant control variables and 
the signs of their coefficients, minor differences among the models as to the coefficient values of 
these control variables will not additionally be emphasized to save space and prevent repetition. 
Therefore, the results related to the control variables will be explained on the basis of the first 
model just as a reference point while the influence of each agency cost proxy on the selected 
financial performance measure will be evaluated in detail in each model. 
Table 5. The Results of the Panel Data Analysis
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When the results of the first model are analyzed, the hypothesized negative influence of 
agency costs on financial performance is found to be statistically valid, which is evidenced by the 
negative and significant coefficient of the explanatory variable OPEXR (z-value = 2.45, p<0.05). 
Therefore, the findings of the analysis associated with the first model show that the null hypothe-
sis is rejected; thus, the financial performance mitigating role of agency costs is found to be valid 
for BRIC countries during the 2003-2014 period. Confirmatory results have been revealed by the 
study of Wang [13] with the operating expense ratio having a negative and significant influence 
on selected proxies of firm performance as measured by ROE and ROA. Pouraghajan et al. [19] 
also support this finding in the model which investigates the link between firm performance as 
measured by ROA and agency costs as measured by operating expense ratio.
The findings of the first model in terms of the control variables demonstrate that all of the 
selected variables have significant influence on EBITDA/TA. The increase in financial perfor-
mance due to a reduction in the firms’ weighted average cost of capital is evidenced by the 
negative and significant coefficient of the variable WACC (z-value = -3.79, p<0.01). The deci-
sions of top management can be evaluated by analyzing WACC of the firm with reference to 
two significant dimensions; namely, operating results and the control of risk factors to maintain 
WACC at an acceptable and reasonable level [47]. As managers make sound financial decisions 
and do not act for pursuing self-serving behaviors, they can keep WACC low, which leads to 
an improvement in the financial performance of the firm. The results of our study are prove 
to be confirmatory with this notion.
The findings related to LNASST demonstrate the negative and significant influence of firm 
size on financial performance (z-value = -3.55, p<0.01). Consistent findings are documented in 
the study of Boardman [50]; whereby, the role of agency costs in explaining performance differ-
ences are investigated with a focus on foreign ownership. The negative and significant effect of 
firm size on financial performance is also found by Chrisman et al. [51] in their study probing 
the influence of agency costs arising due to family ownership on short-term sales growth. Accord-
ingly, it would be appropriate to state that the more flexible nature of small firms and reduced 
hierarchical levels preventing loss of control can add to the financial performance of the firms. 
The decrease in financial performance due to an increase in firms’ leverage is demonstrated 
by the negative and significant coefficient of the variable LEVR (z-value = -9.40, p<0.01). One 
explanation can be related to what is emphasized by Berger and Patti [15] in that increase in 
firms’ leverage results in an increase in expected costs of financial distress, bankruptcy, or liqui-
dation resulting in an increase in agency costs of debt that overwhelms the decrease in agency 
costs of equity. Furthermore, the findings provide evidence of the fact that the increase in the 
amount of debt raises the costs associated with its fulfillment resulting in a decline in the finan-
cial performance of the firm. Additionally, as discussed by Berger and Patti [15] high leverage 
should have a negative influence on performance as a corollary of the agency cost hypothesis. 
This is also emphasized in the study of Kim and Lee [21] in that the investment decisions of a 
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firm with high leverage can be inefficient leading to a decrease in value, which is confirmatory 
with agency theory. Previous works by Chhibber and Majumdar [62], Majumdar and Datta [63], 
Barbosa and Louri [64], Perini et al. [65], Kapopoulos and Lazaretou [66] signal a significant 
and negative relationship between the level of debt and firm performance. 
Prior year performance is found to improve the coming year’s performance as can be seen by 
the positive and significant coefficient of the variable LEBITDA/TA (z-value = 44.76, p<0.01). 
This finding is in line with that of Kordestani et al. [56]; whereby, they hypothesize that financial 
performance of prior years positively influence the financial performance of the current year. 
The findings of the second model with respect to the explanatory variable FCF/TA, which 
demonstrate an insignificant coefficient, are found to be contrary to the expectation that agency 
costs measured by the ratio of free cash flows to total assets deteriorate firms’ financial perfor-
mance. Another study that also reveals insignificant findings on the link between the measure 
of free cash flows and firm performance is that of Pouraghajan et al. [19]. Similar contradictory 
findings have been found by Wang [13] with the positive and significant influence of free cash 
flows on firms’ operating performance, measured by ROA and ROE, indicating no evidence of 
the free cash flow hypothesis. Contrarily, Henry [5] states greater retention of free cash flows 
within the firm to be an indicator of potential agency problems. However, the results docu-
mented in the second model are not supportive of the free cash flow hypothesis and the general 
framework of agency theory since the theoretical background emphasizes that a surplus of free 
cash flows in absence of profitable investment opportunities leads to inefficient use of resources 
with management increasing perquisite consumption. Thus, the findings with respect to our 
second model may arise due to the fact that this variable may not be acting as a proper proxy 
for the selected sample during the specific period analysed. Accordingly, further analysis with 
respect to free cash flows is conducted in the fourth model; whereby, an interaction variable 
related to available investment opportunities - as explained in detail in the subsection related 
to explanatory variables - is utilized. 
The explanatory variables utilized in the first two models are stated to be direct proxies 
of agency costs meaning that as the level of these determinants in the firms increase, agency 
costs incurred within the firm are supposed to increase. Accordingly, a negative relationship 
is expected between the selected proxies of agency costs and financial performance within 
the framework of agency theory. While the findings with respect to the first proxy denoted by 
OPEXR are confirmatory with this notion, those with respect to the second proxy denoted by 
FCT/TA are contradictory with the result being not supportive of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
When the results of the third model that utilizes the indirect measure of agency costs which 
is labeled by ASSTUT are evaluated, it is seen that firms that use their assets in an efficient 
manner rank low in terms of agency costs and improve their financial performance. This can 
be noticed by the positive and significant coefficient of the variable ASSTUT (z-value = 6.47, 
p<0.01). Thus, in line with the first model, the third model also provides evidence for the re-
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jection of null hypothesis in that equity related agency costs are found to deteriorate financial 
performance. This finding is in line with those of Wang [62] in the model that investigates the 
influence of free cash flows and other proxies of agency costs on the operating performance 
of the firm. The significant and positive coefficient of asset utilization ratio documented in 
this study demonstrates that reduction in agency costs improve the operating performance of 
the firm as measured by ROE and ROA. This is notion also supported by Henry [5] in that 
firms that rank low in terms of this ratio are found to create agency costs for shareholders 
as they make non-optimal investment decisions or use funds to acquire unproductive assets. 
Confirmatory findings are also revealed in the study of Pouraghajan et al. [19] whereby they 
demonstrate the positive and significant influence of asset utilization ratio on ROA and ROE 
as indicators of firm performance. 
The findings of the fourth model show the negative but insignificant coefficient of the 
interaction variable that is utilized as the explanatory variable taking into account the amount 
of free cash flows in the case of low growth opportunities. This result is also contrary to our 
expectations and prior literature emphasizing the increase in the agency costs encountered in 
the firm when low growth prospects and high free cash flows are combined [38]. Thus, this 
model also provides further evidence for the selected measure of free cash flows and according-
ly generated interaction variable to be inappropriate proxies for our main variable of interest, 
namely agency costs. Prior studies such as those of Doukas et al. [36], Doukas et al. [37], and 
McKnight and Weir [38] have empirically demonstrated that this interaction variable properly 
acts as a determinant of agency costs in their studies that investigate the link between agency 
costs and certain firm characteristics. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study attempts to provide additional insight onto the discussions related to princi-
ple-agent literature. The dimension that is specifically evaluated adheres to the measurement of 
the costs arising due to the separation of ownership and management and resulting self-serv-
ing behaviors of the agent, who are the managers, and finding out the influence of these costs 
on firms’ financial performance. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the study is mainly based on 
agency theory and associated free cash flow theory. 
The empirical part of the study employs panel data analysis on a dataset of 132 public firms 
listed on the major stock exchanges of BRIC countries during the twelve year period between 
2003 and 2014, inclusive. Four different models have been constructed with each utilizing a 
different proxy for agency costs of equity. Whereas two of these proxies can be classified as 
direct measures of agency costs; namely, operating expense ratio and free cash flow ratio; one of 
them is classified to be an indirect measure, which is the asset utilization ratio. The remaining 
proxy is an interaction variable that accounts for the presence of free cash flows in the case 
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of low growth opportunities. The dependent variable of all models is chosen to be the ratio 
of EBITDA to total assets as this measure is free from the effects of financing and accounting 
decisions together with differences in tax rates.
The findings of the first and third models are confirmatory with our expectations in that 
the selected variables quantifying agency costs are found to be significantly related with our 
financial performance proxy. Whereas the first model incorporates a direct measure; the third 
model utilizes an indirect measure; namely, operating expense ratio and asset utilization ratio. 
Therefore, it is expected and meaningful to observe a negative and positive significant rela-
tionship with the dependent variable, respectively. It would be appropriate to state that high 
levels of discretionary spending by management and inefficient use of corporate assets are 
detrimental to the firms’ owners as documented by these two models. Accordingly, the presence 
of equity related agency costs are documented to deteriorate firm performance as suggested 
by the agency cost theory. 
As emphasized by McKnight and Weir [38], the ability of the capital market to oversee 
managerial decisions is reduced when cash flows are retained by the firm. Accordingly, the 
existence of large free cash flows are assumed to be associated with greater managerial dis-
cretion and higher agency costs. However, the findings with respect to FCT/TA in the second 
model are found to be contradictory to the free cash flow hypothesis and general framework 
of agency theory. Such conflicting results are also revealed by Wang [13]; whereby, two signif-
icant but contrary viewpoints are emphasized. The first one is related to managerial incentives 
with higher amount of free cash flows resulting in managerial perquisite consumption and 
shirking. However, the second viewpoint stresses that free cash flows are generated due to 
management’s operating efficiency that may lead to an inverse relationship between free cash 
flows and agency costs. Confirmatory with the findings of the second model but contrary to 
free cash flow theory and our expectations, the fourth model also provides insignificant results 
as to the presence of free cash flows when there are low growth opportunities. As the other 
proxies utilized have documented results confirming agency theory, it would be appropriate to 
comment that utilization of proxies related with free cash flows is not suitable for our dataset 
during the selected observation period. 
Having found evidence of the negative influence of equity related agency costs on the fi-
nancial performance of our sample firms, further studies could be performed to identify the 
determinants of agency costs. If mechanisms that would mitigate these costs could be found 
and applied in the firms operating in the BRIC countries, financial performance would improve 
which would add to their already high growth potential. Adopting stronger corporate govern-
ance mechanisms, changes in ownership structure, and organizational form could add to the 
alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders [10]; [38]; [45]. Changes in capital 
structure and large shareholdings by institutions could also be evaluated [67]. The impact of 
other additional mechanisms such as analyst monitoring could also be examined in restricting 
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agency costs within the BRIC countries’ setting in line with the work of [36] and [37]. Addi-
tional studies can further be conducted by altering data classification such as extending the 
work on the basis of industrial breakdown. This study could also be extended to analyze the 
influence of agency costs on stock market performance or firm value. 
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